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INTRODUCTION
The world of depository institutions today is undergoing a
revolution of far-reaching significance, one that is fundamentally
changing the ground rules under which financial services are pro-
vided to the American population. Like many revolutions, this
one is fueled by a catastrophe: the spectacular failures of the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation's deposit insurance
fund in the 1980s and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion's (FDIC's) Bank Insurance Fund in the early 1990s. The
enormous cost of these fiascoes - more than $500 billion by
some measures l - has brought this formerly placid and
unimaginative industry under intense political scrutiny, and gen-
erated important legislation, the effects of which are only begin-
ning to be understood.2
At the root of the present crisis lie the perverse incentives
implicit in federal deposit insurance. The system of flat deposit
insurance premiums that prevailed throughout the life of the sys-
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1. The $500 billion figure is one well-known estimate of the eventual costs
of the thrift bailout, interest expenses included. See, e.g., Kleege, The Thrift
Bailout Law: 1 Year Later, Am. Banker, Aug. 2, 1990. EconomistsJames Barth,
Dan Brambaugh and Robert Litan estimate the cost in present value terms at
$200 billion. J.R. Barth, R.D. Brambaugh & R.E. Litan, The Future ofAmerican
Banking (manuscript 1992).
2. The most important recent statutes are the Competitive Equality Bank-
ing Act of 1987 ("CEBA") the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236
(1991) ("FDICIA").
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tern, that is only now being replaced by risk-adjusted premiums,s
seems, in retrospect, to have virtually guaranteed the disaster.
When banks pay the same insurance rates regardless of their level
of risk, they are implicidy being subsidized for taking risks. And
the normal inhibitors against risk-taking that would ordinarily
counter this perverse incentive for risk-taking - the reputations
of depository institution managers, the interest of shareholders in
not losing their investments - disappear or become attenuated
when a depository institution runs into serious financial
problems, since at this point shareholders and managers have lit-
de to lose, and much to gain, from causing their institutions to
engage in highly risky activities in hopes that their firms will re-
turn to solvency. Without a significant class of debtholders
whose own interests would be impaired by this risk-taking strat-
egy, all the incentives of deposit insurance committed sharehold-
ers and managers of depository institutions to engage in risky
business strategies, especially as their institutions ran into finan-
cial difficulties.
This is exacdy what happened during the 1980s, with cata-
clysmic effect. Bankers and (especially) savings and loan manag-
ers committed their institutions to increasingly risky investments,
funded by the seemingly inexhaustible supply of cheap money
which could be obtained through the brokered deposit market.4
It was inevitable that the system would fail. Like the O-rings in
the Challenger space shutde, the defective design of deposit in-
surance went unrecognized through years of apparently success-
ful operation, only to manifest itself in sudden and unexpected -
but, in retrospect, predictable - tragedy.
Today, Congress and the regulators are playing catch-up.
Important and potentially valuable reforms have been imple-
mented - especially in the underestimated Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, which mandated
the use of risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums and required
prompt regulatory intervention for undercapitalized depository
institutions.5
Too often, however, the "reforms" have been backward-
3. Congress instructed the FDIC to implement a system of risk-adjusted de-
posit insurance premiums in FDICIA. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(a) (1988).
4. For discussion of brokered deposits, see, e.g., U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More
Competitive Banks IV.1-IV.15 (1991).
5. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(a) (1988) (risk-adjusted premiums); FDIC1A
§ 131 (prompt corrective action).
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline -- 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 867 1991
ENHANCED CONSUMER CHOICE 867
looking rather than fonvard-looking. Congress has failed to cut
back even marginally on the preposterous insurance ceiling of
$100,000 per depositor per institution. And in the name of pro-
tecting the deposit insurance system against future losses, Con-
gress has hamstrung the banking industry in its ability to compete
with nonbank institutions in an increasingly integrated financial
services marketplace - for example, by imposing draconian sanc-
tions on bank officials for banking law violations,6 restricting the
ability of banks to engage in price competition for deposits,7 in-
creasing the costs of examination and regulatory compliance,8
and requiring depository institutions to make unprofitable and
geographically nondiversified loans in the name of "community
reinvestment."9
In vowing not to repeat the mistakes of the past, Congress
and the regulators have made new mistakes. By focusing blame
on convenient scapegoats - the "savings and loan crooks" such
as the archetypal Charles Keating, and the allegedly excessive de-
regulation of the Reagan Administration - the political system
has deflected attention from the fundamental fact that the regula-
tory system of deposit insurance was defective from the start.
In this paper we argue that the banking industry cannot easily
sustain the costs of these backward-looking regulations, especially
given the existence of powerful nonbank competitors not subject
to similar regulatory burdens. The burdens of this regulatory sys-
tem, moreover, fall disproportionately on consumers who have
the least flexibility in structuring their financial affairs in order to
avoid the increasingly uneconomic banking system. We propose
a simple reform designed to remedy some, but not all, of these
problems: the establishment of uninsured depository facilities -
or, to use a more convenient if less exact terminology, consumer
choice banks.
A consumer choice bank, as we envision it, is simply a bank
chartered and regulated at the state level which is not insured by
the FDIC or subject to most of the existing forms of federal bank
regulation. Such a bank would be able to operate at lower costs,
and with greater efficiency and more flexibility, than existing com-
6. See Macey & Miller, Banking Law and Regulation 616-19 (1992).
7. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831(f) (1988) (restricting use of brokered deposits by
insured financial institutions).
8. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)-(e) (1988) (annual full-scope, on-site examina-
tions required for all insured depository institutions; costs may be assessed
against the insured institution).
9. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901-2907 (1988) (Community Reinvestment Act).
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mercial banks or thrift institutions. For this reason, it would be
able to pay higher interest on deposits than banks which are fed-
erally regulated and insured. The consumer choice bank would
thus be capable of competing with nonbank financial institutions
on a more level playing field.
The benefits of the enhanced flexibility of operations would
not be limited to depository institutions. Rather, these advan-
tages would be substantially passed on to consumers of banking
services, especially individuals and small businesses that are cur-
rently unable to take advantage of the sophisticated regulatory
avoidance strategies available to larger corporate depositors.
Thus, in addition to mitigating the existing competitive imbalance
between depository and nondepository financial institutions, the
consumer choice bank would also facilitate the establishment of a
more level playing field as between large and small depositors.
In addition to evening the playing field on which banks and
nonbanks now compete, and providing consumers with an option
currently unavailable to them, the consumer choice bank offers
additional advantages in terms of regulatory flexibility and capital
formation. Because deposits in consumer choice banks would not
be insured, the federal government's interest in regulating these
banks would be much smaller than its interest in regulating tradi-
tional insured banks. Consumer choice banks could be allowed to
take on levels of risk, or experiment with activities, that would be
unacceptable for banks operating under federal deposit insur-
ance, even under the forthcoming system of risk-adjusted premi-
ums. Consumer choice banks could thus fill market niches that
are inadequately served by existing depository institutions, and
could act as innovators in the development of new banking prod-
ucts or services that, if successful, might be allowed for depository
institutions operating under federal deposit insurance.
Consumer choice banks would also offer the opportunity, at
the state level, for new capital to enter the banking system, since
under existing federal law an uninsured consumer choice bank
could be owned by all sorts of nonbanking firms so long as it
stayed out of the business of making commercial loans. 10 The in-
flux of new capital into the banking system would appear desira-
ble given the severe problems of undercapitalization which
accompanied the disasters of recent years, and which are only
now beginning to be rectified. Ownership of consumer choice
10. See text accompanying notes 61-70 infra.
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banks by nonbank institutions would potentially increase compe-
tition in the banking industry, thus enhancing consumer benefits.
The principal argument against the consumer choice bank is
that consumers could be confused into believing that a deposit at
a consumer choice bank is federally insured. To the extent that
this is a real danger, it could be considerably mitigated by rela-
tively simple regulations. Consumer choice banks could be
housed separately from traditional banks and called by a distinc-
tive name in order to avoid the danger of consumer confusion
between uninsured and insured accounts. Such banks would have
to publicly disclose that their accounts are not insured, both in
advertising and in written disclosure to depositors. I I Moreover,
states could require consumer choice banks to make regular dis-
closures of financial condition to depositors in order to facilitate
an informed choice about whether the risks of banking with an
uninsured depository facility outweigh the benefits. States could
also impose minimum capital rules on these institutions. We be-
lieve that with such safeguards in place consumers could distin-
guish between insured and uninsured accounts. Most consumers
would probably elect to keep their funds in an insured account;
but for others who make an informed decision to take on a higher
level ofrisk in exchange for a greater return, there seems to be no
compelling reason of policy why they should be prohibited from
doing so.
No federal legislation would be required to establish con-
sumer choice banks within a state, although federal legislation
would restrict the activities of consumer choice banks in certain
ways, and would significantly restrict the ability of thrift institu-
tions to operate without federal deposit insurance. 12 As regards
state law, it would appear possible for banking institutions to es-
tablish or convert into consumer banks under existing law of
states. For these states, consumer choice banks would become a
reality without statutory amendment. Other states require their
state-chartered banks to obtain federal deposit insurance. 13 In
these states, modest statutory amendments would be required to
implement the consumer choice bank experiment.
We do not propose the consumer choice bank as any kind of
panacea to the problems in the banking industry. These
problems are extraordinarily deep-seated, and more fundamental
11. Such a requirement is present in existing federal law. See infra notes
18-20 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 18-48 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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reform than this may well be required in the long run if the indus-
try is to remain viable as a provider offinancial products and serv-
ices in the years to come. We view incremental reform such as
that represented by the consumer choice bank as merely moving
the system in the direction of a more basic restructuring. For the
time being, however, and in light of present political and eco-
nomic conditions, the consumer choice bank may be well worth
serious investigation by depository institutions, state legislators,
and others concerned with the future of this troubled but vitally
important industry.
This article is structured as follows. Part I discusses the con-
cept of consumer choice banks in general terms. Part II considers
the legal regulation applicable to such institutions. Part III ad-
dresses the pros and cons of consumer choice banks. We end
with a brief conclusion.
I.
THE CONCEPT OF CONSUMER CHOICE BANKS
A consumer choice bank is a state-chartered bank that is not
insured by the FDIC. The name is intended to refer both to the
fact that this type of institution would offer consumers a choice -
between lower-interest, federally insured accounts at an insured
depository institution, on the one hand, and higher interest, unin-
sured accounts at an uninsured depository facility, on the other
- and to the fact that the principal beneficiaries of such unin-
sured depository facilities would include consumers, who, unlike
the treasurers of large corporations, do not currently enjoy ready
access to uninsured, higher-yield transaction accounts at financial
institutions.
The structure and specific rules governing consumer choice
banks would depend on the regulations adopted in each state. It
is thus difficult to provide a detailed picture of what consumer
choice banks would look like, other than to observe that they
would not operate with federal deposit insurance. One appealing
model, however, is as follows. The consumer choice bank would
be established as a separate uninsured depository facility. It
would have its own building or office, which would be kept sepa-
rate from any banking facility offering insured deposit accounts.
The name of the facility would be such as to minimize the danger
of customer confusion with insured depository institutions. For
example, the institution might be prohibited from calling itself a
"bank" (without more), a "savings bank" or a "savings and loan."
The institution would be required to comply with the existing fed-
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erallaw, described below,14 which mandates extensive disclosure
of the absence of deposit insurance. It would be permitted to of-
fer a full-service deposit and lending business.15 Depending on
the state, it might be permitted to engage in activities that differ
(either by being broader or narrower) from the activities permit-
ted to state-chartered institutions generally under state law. Be-
cause customers are informed that the bank is not insured, they
are on notice that their funds are at risk, and the bank accordingly
could be permitted to choose its own asset portfolio and fee-gen-
erating activities with less regulatory scrutiny from the state regu-
lators than otherwise might be the case.
Consumer choice banks could display a variety of ownership
structures. Entrepreneurs could establish such banks as start-up
firms. Existing bank holding companies could establish such
banks de novo, or could convert a bank or thrift subsidiary into a
consumer choice bank by giving up its federal deposit insurance.
If a consumer choice bank stayed out of the business of making
commercial loans, or alternatively avoided offering demand de-
posit accounts, it might qualify as a nonbank bank, and could be
owned or operated by a wide variety of nonbanking firms. 16 The
states would in the first instance be able to set the limits of the
ownership structure of the consumer choice banks established
under their authority.
II.
LEGAL REGULATION OF CONSUMER CHOICE BANKS
In this section we consider the legal regulations applicable to
uninsured depository facilities. It should be noted at the outset
that because these institutions, as we envisage them, would be
chartered as banks, they would be subject to state regulations ap-
plicable to state-chartered banks.17 They might even be subject
to more stringent regulations than ordinary state-chartered banks
if a given state elected to adopt special statutory rules to govern
their activities. The key distinction between consumer choice
14. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
15. If, however, the bank wished to be treated as a nonbank bank for pur-
poses of the Bank Holding Company Act it would have to give up either its
demand deposit business or its commercial loan business. See infra notes 61-70
and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
17. It is possible, of course, that an uninsured depository facility could op-
erate without obtaining a bank charter. We do not consider such institutions in
the present article.
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banks and other banks is that because they are not federally in-
sured, they would avoid much of the regulatory regime applica-
ble to institutions that do operate with federal insurance. It turns
out that avoiding federal insurance would have significant regula-
tory consequences.
Restrictions on Relinquishing Federal Deposit Insurance. - Con-
sumer choice banks would be permissible under existing federal
law, subject to certain limitations. Nothing in federal law requires
depository institutions to obtain federal deposit insurance; in-
deed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act quite clearly contem-
plates that state-chartered institutions may elect to operate
without federal deposit insurance, at least if doing so is permissi-
ble under the laws of their chartering state. However, federal law
does impose certain restrictions on depository institutions that
wish to operate without federal deposit insurance.
Under the 1991 FDICIA legislation, all non-federally insured
depository institutions, whether operating under bank or thrift
charter, must now comply with certain federal disclosure require-
ments. An uninsured institution must place on all periodic state-
ments, signature cards, passbooks, and certificates of deposit a
conspicuous notice to the effect that it is not federally insured and
that the depositor stands to lose money if the institution fails. IS
Similar notice must be included at the bank premises and on all
advertising. 19 Depositors must acknowledge in writing that the
institution in which they are placing their funds is not federally
insured and that their deposits are at risk in the event of bank
failure. 20
In addition to these disclosure requirements applicable to all
nonfederally insured depository institutions, the FDICIA contains
special rules applicable to nonbank (Le., thrift) institutions.
Thrift institutions must meet all "eligibility requirements" for
federal deposit insurance even if they are not insured.21 The ef-
fect of this provision is not entirely clear, and probably was not
thought through carefully by its congressional drafters, but the
18. FDICIA § 151, adding new 40(b)(l) to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act.
19. Id. at § 40(b)(2).
20. Id. at § 40(b)(3). The Federal Trade Commission is instructed to pro-
mulgate rules governing the manner and content of the required disclosure. Id.
at 40(c).
21. FDICIA § 151, adding new § 40(e)(l) to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act. The Federal Trade Commission, in consultation with the FDIC. can make
exceptions to this requirement. Id.
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rule would appear to mean, at least, that any uninsured thrift in-
stitution must meet the factors for insurability under section 6 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.22 To a significant, although
uncertain, extent, therefore, it would appear that an uninsured
thrift institution would be subject to regulations similar to those
applicable to federally insured institutions.
On the other hand, the statute does not prohibit state-
chartered thrift institutions from operating without federal de-
posit insurance, provided they comply with the substantive eligi-
bility standards that apply to insured institutions, and to this
extent a consumer choice bank could operate under thrift institu-
tion charter. Moreover, since the obligation of complying with
the FDIC's eligibility requirements does not extend to institutions
operating under bank charter, a banking firm would presumably
have the option of converting an existing thrift subsidiary over to
bank charter, or of obtaining a de novo bank charter for a start-
up institution, in order to operate a consumer choice bank free of
the FDIC's eligibility requirements.
Turning to state law, it appears that consumer choice banks
would not be possible under the existing law in a significant
number of states. Although the traditional rule is that state-
chartered banks are permitted, but not required, to obtain federal
deposit insurance, the problem of bank failures during the 1980s
stimulated a spate of state laws requiring state-chartered institu-
tions to obtain federal deposit insurance. Such legislation is in
effect in more than half the states.23 Moreover, even without such
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1816. The relevant factors include the financial history and
condition of the institution, the adequacy of the institution's capital structure,
the future earnings prospects of the institution, the general character and fitness
of the management of the depository institution, the convenience and needs of
the community to be served by the institution, and whether the institution's cor-
porate powers are consistent with the purposes of the Act. Id.
23. See Ala. Code § 5-5A-12 (1991); Alaska Stat. 06.05.355(a) (1991) (bank
must be a member of the FDIC to begin business, but can voluntarily relinquish
membership with the consent of the state banking department); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 6-204 (1992); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-3-110(6) (1991); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 36-1421(1) (1990); D.C. Code Ann. 26-807.1 (1991); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 17, 1i
320 (1991); Iowa Code §§ 524.802, 524.816 (1989) (all state-chanered banks
must acquire deposit insurance effective July 1, 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 6:216, 6:1135 (West 1991); Mich. Code Ann. § 487.358 (1991) (banks must
be insured by the FDIC unless commissioner waives requirement for good cause
shown); Minn. Stat. § 46.045 (1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659.085 (Michie
1991) N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 386-A:19a (1990); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-1-70 (1991);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-9.1 (1991); N.D. Cent. Code § 6-02-03 (1991); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1101.061 (1987)(newly chartered banks must obtain federal de-
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legislation on the books, in some states, as a practical matter, a
proposed depository institution must promise to seek FDIC in-
surance in order to obtain a charter from the state regulator, and
a decision to relinquish the status of a federally insured institu-
tion would be viewed with dismay or even rejected by the respon-
sible officia1.24 In states where FDIC insurance is required either
as a matter of statute law or by administrative discretion, the es-
tablishment of consumer choice banks would require a change in
existing practice.
In some states, however, it appears that a consumer choice
bank could be established without a change in existing practice.
This should be no surprise: the consumer choice bank concept is
merely a modern variant ofa traditional form of depository insti-
tution, the state-chartered bank or thrift institution that elected
for whatever reason to operate without federal deposit insurance.
Even if the law ofa given state permitted the establishment of
a consumer choice bank, however, we would expect that state
banking regulators would use their discretionary authority over
the activities of such banks as necessary to ensure that the dan-
gers of consumer confusion are minimized, subject to the need to
allow the bank a reasonable flexibility in operations.
Activities Restrictions. - We now consider the activities restric-
tions applicable to consumer choice banks. It turns out that unin-
sured depository facilities operating under bank charter could,
depending on applicable state law, engage in a wide range of ac-
tivities not permitted to similarly situated insured institutions.
Uninsured deposit facilities operating as savings institutions,
however, would be considerably more circumscribed in their
operations.
The general rule, in the absence of federal pre-emption, is
that a state-chartered depository institution can engage in any ac-
tivity permissible under state law, even if similarly situated nation-
ally chartered institutions could not engage in such activities.
The states have used their powers to allow state-chartered banks
posit insurance; existing uninsured banks may continue in business but must
post notice); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 708.026 (1989); Pa. Stat. § 7:105(A) (1991); R I.
Gen. Laws § 19-11-9 (1991); Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-14-103 (1991); Utah Code
Ann. § 7-3-3 (1991); Va. Code Ann. § 6.1- 2.9:4 (1991); W.V. Code § 31A-I-6
(1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 13-2-103 (1991).
24. In Georgia. for example, although FDIC insurance is apparently not re-
quired under the statute, it is necessary for every state-chartered bank to obtain
some form of deposit insurance satisfactory to the state banking department.
Ga. Code Ann. § 7-1-244 (1991).
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or thrift institutions to enter a variety of nontraditional activities,
including underwriting insurance,25 underwriting securities,26 op-
erating travel agencies,27 investing in real estate equities,28 and
more.
In the case of thrift institutions, these advantages of state
chartering have been considerably undercut by FIRREA. Under
section 222 of FIRREA, state-chartered savings associations -
whether or not they operate with federal deposit insurance -
may not engage as principal in activities not permitted to feder-
ally-chartered savings associations, unless the FDIC has deter-
mined that the activity in question would pose no significant risk
to the federal deposit insurance fund and the savings association
is in compliance with federal capital adequacy guidelines.29 State
chartered savings institutions are also barred from engaging in an
activity permitted to a federal savings association in an amount that
is not permissible for a federal association if either (a) the FDIC
has determined that engaging in that amount of activity poses a
significant risk to the deposit insurance fund, or (b) the state-
chartered institution is not in compliance with federal capital ade-
quacy guidelines.gO And state-chartered savings associations are
generally prohibited from acquiring or retaining any equity in-
vestment of a type or in an amount that is not permissible for a
federal savings association; this would prohibit most direct invest-
ments in real estate (other then premises or property held as col-
lateral), as well as most partnership interests, corporate stock, or
other miscellaneous equity investments.gl The net effect of these
provisions is to leave only a narrow window for state-chartered
thrift institutions to act in ways not permitted to their federal
counterparts. Significantly, moreover, a state-chartered savings
association would not escape these preemptive federal rules by
giving up federal deposit insurance.
State chartered banks, on the other hand, do gain potentially
enhanced activities powers if they relinquish federal deposit in-
surance. Section 303 ofFDICIA provides that insured state banks
25. See, e.g., Conference ofState Bank Supervisors, State Authorization of
Selected Expanded Activities for State-Chartered Banks (1989).
26. See, e.g., Conference ofState Bank Supervisors, State Authorization of
Selected Expanded Activities for State-Chartered Banks (1989).
27. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 51-18-1.2 (1991).
28. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State Authorization of Se-
lected Expanded Activities for State-Chartered Banks (1989).
29. FIRREA § 222, adding 28 to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
30. FIRREA § 222, adding 28 to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
31. FIRREA § 222, adding 28(c) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
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may not engage as a principal in any activity that is not permitted
for a national bank unless the FDIC has determined that the activ-
ity would pose no significant risk to the appropriate deposit insur-
ance fund and the state bank complies with federal capital
adequacy guidelines.1l2 Apparently insured state chartered banks
may engage in activities permitted to national banks in amounts
beyond those authorized for national banks; thus the pre-emption
of state bank activities is less severe than that of state savings as-
sociation activities. The new statute also generally restricts eq-
uity investments by insured state banks and their subsidiaries to
those investments that would be permitted to a national bank. llll
These new preemptive rules apply only to state-chartered
banks that operate with federal deposit insurance. Thus, it would
appear that an uninsured depository facility chartered as a state
bank would continue to operate free of any general federal pre-
emption on the type or amount of its activities. In this respect the
1991 legislation, by restricting the activities of insured state-
chartered banks, has significantly enhanced the degree to which
uninsured state-chartered banks can operate free of the restrictions
that apply to other financial institutions.
In addition to these general rules, uninsured depository facil-
ities could also enjoy certain securities powers beyond those
available to insured institutions. The only provision of the Glass-
Steagall Act applicable to the securities activities of an uninsured
depository facility is § 21, which prohibits institutions engaged
"to any extent whatever" in the business of deposit banking from
engaging in the business of "issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing ... stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securi-
ties."ll4 Section 21 generally bars banks, including state-
32. FDICIA § 303. State-chartered institutions may continue to act as
agents without federal pre-emption, so long as they restrict themselves to this
role and do not become principals in the enterprise. Id.
33. FDICIA § 303. National banks have only very limited powers to invest
in real estate equities, see 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1988) (providing limited authorization
to own premises and related properties and to hold real estate obtained in satis-
faction of debts or purchased at foreclosure sales); 12 U.S.C. § 371(d) (1988)
(investment in premises may not exceed the amount of a bank's capital stock).
National bank powers to invest in equity securities are severely circumscribed
under 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988). National banks can invest up to 10% of capital
and surplus in bank service corporations, which are allowed to engage in activi-
ties permissible to bank holding companies. See 12 U.S.C. § 1864(f) (1988).
National banks may also acquire stock in small business investment companies in
an amount up to 5% of the bank's capital and surplus. See 15 U.S.C. § 682(b)
(1988).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988).
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chartered nonmember banks, from the business of securities un-
derwriting. Section 21, however, does not apply to the activities
of nonbank subsidiaries of state-chartered banks.35 Insured non-
member banks can, accordingly, engage in a range of securities
activities through a wholly-owned subsidiary.
As state-chartered, nonmember banks, consumer choice
banks would have the same option available to all such banks of
establishing securities subsidiaries free of the strictures of § 21 of
the Glass-Steagall Act.36 In addition, however, it would appear
that by eschewing deposit insurance, a consumer choice bank
could also avoid the FDIC's regulations otherwise applicable to
such securities activities.37 Among other things, these regulations
generally limit the underwriting activities of subsidiaries of in-
sured nonmember banks, which have not been in continuous op-
eration for five years, to the underwriting of "investment quality"
debt and equity securities38 and high-grade investment company
securities.39 Thus, a newly formed subsidiary of an insured non-
member bank could not underwrite high-yield debt, initial public
offerings ofsecurities, limited partnership interests, and other in-
vestments not included on the FDIC's list.40 The regulations
35. See Investment Company Institute v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,
815 F.2d 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); National Council
of Savings Institutions v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 664 F.Supp. 572
(D.D.C. 1987).
36. However, if the state-chartered bank was part of a bank holding com-
pany that included national or state member banks, the rule in § 20 of the Glass-
Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988), governing affiliations between banking and
securities firms might come into play. A banking organization couId presumably
avoid this problem by relinquishing its membership in the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, since § 20 does not apply to state-chartered, nonmember banks whether or
not insured. See M. Fein, Securities Activities of Banks 2.01[C](looseleaf).
37. The FDIC's regulations are codified at 12 C.F.R. 337.4.
38. 12 C.F.R. 337.4(b)(1). Investment quality debt securities are "marketa-
ble" obligations rated in the top four rating categories by a nationally recog-
nized rating service or marketable obligations with investment characteristics
equivalent to such top-rated obligations. Id.337.4(a)(7). Investment quality eq-
uity securities are marketable common or preferred stock ranked or graded in
the top four categories or equivalent by a nationally recognized rating service, or
marketable preferred corporate stock with investment characteristics equivalent
to the investment characteristics of top rated preferred corporate stock. rd.
337.4(a)(8).
39. I.e., investment companies not more than 25% of whose assets consist
of investments other than investment quality debt or equity securities, or not
more than 25% ofwhich consist of investments other than instruments normally
associated with a money market fund. 12 C.F.R. 337.4(b)(l)(iiHC)-(D).
40. Once the subsidiary has been in continuous operation for five years, it is
permitted to underwrite securities not on the FDIC's list if it is a member in
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also impose significant limitations on transactions between in-
sured nonmember banks and their securities subsidiaries or affili-
ates.41 In most cases the subsidiary or affiliate must also disclose
to customers that their investments are not insured by the
FDIC.42
These limitations on the securities activities of subsidiaries of
insured nonmember banks would not apply to the insurance activi-
ties of consumer choice banks, since the FDIC's rules are explic-
itly tied to the bank's insured status.43 Thus a consumer choice
bank could engage in securities activities with more flexibility of
operations than a similarly situated insured bank, subject of
~ourse to whatever rules the bank's chartering state elected to
Impose.
Consumer choice banks would also have significantly greater
powers than insured banks and bank holding companies in the
area of insurance underwriting. National banks have traditionally
been barred from most forms of insurance underwriting.44 As of
1991, insured state banks are also prohibited from engaging in
insurance underwriting "except to the extent that activity is per-
missible for national banks."45 Restrictive rules also apply at the
holding company level: most forms of insurance underwriting are
prohibited for bank holding companies and their nonbank subsid-
iaries under Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act.46
good standing of the National Association of Securities Dealers and meets cer-
tain other conditions. 12 C.F.R. 337.4(b)(2).
41. See 12 C.F.R. 337.4(e).
42. See 12 C.F.R. 337.4(h).
43. If a consumer choice bank were chartered as a subsidiary of a holding
company that also included an FDIC-insured bank in its organization, the
FDIC's affiliate rules might require separation of the facilities and management
of the consumer choice bank's securities subsidiary and those of the insured
bank. See 12 C.F.R. 337.4(c).
44. National banks have traditionally been restricted, under § 92 of the Na-
tional Bank Act, to acting as insurance agents in towns of 5,000 or less. See
Saxon v. Georgia Association ofIndependent Insurance Agents, 399 F.2d 1010
(5th Cir. 1968)(rejecting Comptroller's attempt to allow national banks to act as
agents in towns of more than 5,000). Even this authority is now in jeopardy as a
result of a recent appeals court ruling that 92 was repealed in 1918. See In-
dependent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir.
1992). In addition to their now-questionable agency powers, national banks
have also been permitted to engage in limited forms of insurance underwriting
related to their lending function. See 1 H. Pitt, D. Miles, & A. Ain, The Law of
Financial Services 3[B][2] (1988).
45. FDICIA § 303, adding 24(b)(l) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). The limitations on insurance underwrit-
ing were introduced by Title VI of the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline -- 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 879 1991
ENHANCED CONSUMER CHOICE 879
Consumer choice banks, however, would not be subject to
these limitations on insurance activities. Accordingly, they could
continue to take advantage of the powers, afforded by Delaware,
South Dakota and other states, to engage in general insurance
underwriting business.47 They may apparently do so, moreover,
even if the consumer choice bank is chartered as a subsidiary ofa
bank holding company which includes insured depository institu-
tions. Nothing in the Bank Holding Company Act permits the
Federal Reserve Board to regulate the activities of a state-
chartered bank subsidiary ofa bank holding company, including a
subsidiary that is operating without federal deposit insurance:18
Capital Structure. - Consumer choice banks would operate
with a potentially different capital structure than that applicable
to insured depository institutions. Such institutions would not be
required to comply with federal capital adequacy guidelines,
which apply only to federally insured depository institutions.
They would, accordingly, have more freedom to arrange their
capital structure as demanded by market conditions, rather than
under the binding constraints of federal guidelines. States, how-
ever, would be free to impose their own capital adequacy guide-
lines on these institutions, which could be more stringent, less
stringent, or identical to the federal guidelines.49
Consumer choice banks would also be free of certain existing
regulations of insured institutions that impose liability on affili-
ates of insured depository institutions. Bank holding companies
that own or control consumer choice banks might be subject to
the Federal Reserve Board's "source of strength" policy, which
97-320, 96 Stat. 1536 {1982}. The statute contains a number of exemptions.
including one, tracking 92 of the National Bank Act. for general insurance activ-
ities in towns of5,000 or less, or other locations that the bank holding company
can demonstrate have inadequate insurance agency facilities. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c}{8}{C}.
47. See generally 1 H. Pitt, D. Miles & A. Ain. The Law ofFinancial Services
3[B][4](1988}.
48. See Ind. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Bd. of Governors. 890 F.2d 1275 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, HI S.Ct.44 (1990). This is not to say that the Board
could not find ways to make life difficult for a bank holding company that chose
to flout the Board's will or undermine its regulatory authority.
49. Even without regulation, it is probable that consumer choice banks
would operate with significantly higher capital ratios than those characterizing
insured depository institutions today. Prior to the institution of deposit insur-
ance capital ratios were, in general, much higher than they have been since de-
posit insurance became effective. See Kaufman. Capital in Banking: Past,
Present and Future (manuscript 1992); Macey & Miller. Double Liability ofBank
Shareholders: History and Implications. 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31 (1992).
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ostensibly requires bank holding companies to provide capital in-
fusions to failed or failing subsidiary banks.50 It is not clear, how-
ever, whether, even if it is good law,5! the source of strength
policy would apply to uninsured depository institutions. Argua-
bly, a transfer offunds to an uninsured institution from a holding
company controlling both insured and uninsured depository in-
stitutions would not fall within the purposes of the source of
strength policy. In addition to their possible regulation under the
source of strength policy, consumer choice banks held in holding
company form would presumably be subject to the limitations
under the Federal Reserve Act on transactions among affiliated
institutions.52
Consumer choice banks would not be subject to the cross-
guarantee rule of FIRREA,53 which subjects the assets of insured
depository institutions to the FDIC's claim for its losses in resolv-
ing any commonly controlled insured depository institution. Be-
cause the consumer choice bank is not federally insured, its assets
would not be reachable under the cross-guarantee rule in the
event of the failure of an insured bank under common ownership
or control. Conversely, the cross-guarantee rule would not place
the assets of any commonly controlled institution, insured or un-
insured, at risk in the event that a consumer choice bank becomes
insolvent, since the insolvency of a consumer choice bank would
involve no costs to the FDIC.
Enforcement Rules. - The freedom from federal regulation en-
joyed by consumer choice banks would be mirrored by their ap-
parent exemption from most federal enforcement powers.
Consumer choice banks would, for example, appear to be exempt
from cease-and-desist orders, both temporary54 and final;55 from
orders of suspension, removal or prohibition directed at person-
50. See 12 C.F.R. 225.4(a)(l)(providing that "a bank holding company
shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary
banks and shall not conduct its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner.").
51. The Fifth Circuit rejected the Board's source of strength policy in
MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Bd. ofGovernors, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), but the
Supreme Court reversed on technical grounds, 112 S.Ct. 459 (1991), leaving the
substantive issue undecided.
52. See Federal Reserve Act 23A, 23B, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c, 371c-
1.
53. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e).
54. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (1988)(temporary cease-and-desist power pro-
vided, but apparently limited to federally insured institutions).
55. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(final cease-and·desist power provided, but ap-
parently limited to federally insured institutions).
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nel;55 and from emergency prohibition and suspension orders.57
Consumer choice banks would be exempt from most, ifnot all, of
the draconian civil monetary penalties which, under FIRREA, can
reach levels as high as $1 million per day per offense.58 Con-
sumer choice banks would be exempt from most of the criminal
prohibitions under the federallaw.59 In short, because consumer
choice banks would not be federally regulated for most purposes,
they would be outside the scope of many federal enforcement
mechanisms that implement substantive federal regulations.GO
Ownership Restrictions. - A final distinction between consumer
choice banks and similarly situated insured institutions would be
that, with suitable modifications to their operations, the fonner
can be structured so as to avoid federal restrictions on O\'ffiership
of banks by nonbanking finns. The legal mechanism for avoiding
such ownership restrictions would be a new fonn of the fabled
nonbank bank. In this section we argue that the nonbank bank,
widely believed to have been executed by Congress in 1987 for
the crime of deregulating the banking industry, may not be dead,
but only sleeping.
The nonbank bank arose as a means for avoiding the restric-
tions on geographic and product expansion that apply to bank
holding companies under the Bank Holding Company Act.51 The
key was the definition of the tenn "bank" under the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act. Prior to 1987 the statute defined "bank" to
mean an institution that both accepted demand deposits and
56. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818{e}(powers over personnel apparently limited to
persons serving at insured depository institutions).
57. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818{e}(3){emergency suspension or removal power
apparently limited to insured depository institutions).
58. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818{i){2){setting forth "general provisions for deposi-
tory institutions insured by the FDIC").
59. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 656-657 (prohibiting embezzlement or misappli-
cation of funds from federally insured depository institutions); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1818{j){violation of removal or suspension order against FDIC-insured de-
pository institution).
60. Again, however, we emphasize that their exemption from federal regu-
lation is not a licence to act free of all government supervision, since consumer
choice banks would be subject to plenary state regulation.
61. Section 4(c){8) of the Bank Holding Company Act requires that the ac-
tivities ofbank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries be "so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c}(8) (1988). The Douglas Amendment to the Bank
Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842{d) (1988), prohibits interstate bank
holding company acquisitions of subsidiary banks unless the acquisition is "spe-
cifically authorized by the laws of the State in which [the proposed subsidiary
bank] is located, by language to that effect and not merely by implication."
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made commercialloans.62 Under this definition, it was perfectly
possible for an institution to do nearly everything that a tradi-
tional commercial bank does, and yet still not be classified as a
"bank" under the Bank Holding Company Act.61~ An institution
could, for example, operate as a federally insured national or
state-chartered bank - thus acting as a bank for most practical
purposes - yet avoid being classified as a bank under the Bank
Holding Company Act by the simple device of eschewing com-
mercialloans. It could make home mortgage and consumer loans
without risking its status as a nonbank bank; and if it wished to
extend credit to businesses, it could engage in the functional
equivalent of commercial lending by purchasing the commercial
paper issued by major corporations.64 Alternatively, an institu-
tion could avoid being classified as a bank under the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act by limiting its depository activities to NOW
accounts on which the bank retained a purely formal right to in-
sist that the depositor give notice before making a withdrawal.
Such a bank could make an unlimited amount of commercial
loans and still avoid being classed as a bank so long as it avoided
offering checking accounts.
In 1987, after the Federal Reserve Board had tried unsuc-
cessfully to plug the loophole by regulation,65 Congress scrapped
the old, troublesome definition of "bank." The new statute de-
fines a bank for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act as an
institution that (1) is an "insured bank" under the Federal De-
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1982). The original Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 had defined "bank" quite broadly to include all national banks and all
state-chartered banks, savings banks, and trust companies. Act of May 9, 1956,
Pub. L. No. 84-511, 2,70 Stat. 133 (1956). In 1966 Congress excluded savings
banks, trust companies, and industrial banks from the statute by redefining
"bank" to mean "any institution that accepts deposits that the depositor has a
legal right to withdraw on demand," Act of July I, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89·485, 3,
80 Stat. 236 (1966). Congress added the additional requirement that the institu·
tion also be "engaged in the business of making commercial loans" in the 1970
amendments to the Act. Act of Dec. 31,1970, Pub. L. No. 91·607, 101(c),84
Stat. 1760, 1762.
63. See generally Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks-An Issue in Need of a Pol·
icy, 41 Bus. Law. 99 (1985)(discussing regulatory avoidance potential of non·
bank banks).
64. On commercial paper as the functional equivalent of commercial loans,
see Litt, Macey, Miller & Rubin, Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets:
Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States andJapan,
139 University of Penn. L. Rev. 369 (1990).
65. See Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 364
(1986).
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posit Insurance Act, or that (2) both (a) accepts demand deposits
or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar
means ofpayment to third parties or others; and (b) is engaged in
the business ofmaking commercialloans.66 A bank is an "insured
bank" if its deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.67 This includes all national banks, all member
banks of the Federal Reserve System, and state-chartered, non-
member banks that apply for and obtain federal insurance. Ex-
isting nonbank banks were grandfathered, but severe restrictions
were placed on their ability to expand beyond their existing
operations.68
Although Congress tightened up the nonbank bank option, it
did not prohibit such institutions altogether. Even under the new
definition it remained technically possible for an institution to op-
erate as a bank without being classified as a bank under the Bank
Holding Company Act. A state-chartered bank could still qualify
as a nonbank bank if it did two things: (1) give up its federal de-
posit insurance coverage; and (2) either get out of the business of
offering demand deposit accounts or avoid making commercial
loans.69
The principal legal implication for the nonbank bank is that
such an institution may be owned by any sort of firm, including
firms outside the banking industry. Because the subsidiary insti-
tution would not come within the definition of a "bank" for pur-
poses of the Bank Holding Company Act, the parent organization
would not be, by reason of that ownership, a bank holding com-
pany subject to the act. Thus an institution that owns one or
more nonbank banks can avoid the requirement that it be en-
gaged solely in activities "closely related to banking."70 A com-
pany of any sort could own and operate a consumer choice bank
so long as the bank either avoided offering demand deposit ac-
counts or stayed out of the business of making commercial loans.
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(cHl) (1988).
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1988).
68. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, § 101(c), codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1843(f)-(h).
69. The Conference Committee recognized this explicitly: "the bill would
not cover as a bank an uninsured institution that did not, for example, offer
demand deposit or transaction accounts, or one that offered such accounts but
did not engage in the business of making commercial loans." Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987, H.R. Rep. No. 100-261. 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
120 (1987).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(cH8) (1988).
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III.
PROS AND CONS OF CONSUMER CHOICE BANKS
Having set forth a brief description of what a consumer
choice bank would look like, and discussed the legal regulation
applicable to such banks, we now turn to an analysis of the costs
and benefits of such an institution. As should already be evident,
we believe that the benefits of such an institution are likely to ex-
ceed the costs. Our reasons follow.
Advantages of Consumer Choice Banks. - The main advantages
of consumer choice banks are these: (1) they permit banking insti-
tutions to compete on more equal terms with nonbank financial
institutions by offering uninsured deposit accounts to consumers;
(2) they offer consumers and small businesses the option to place
funds in an uninsured account, which they might reasonably want
to do in order to earn higher interest, even at the cost of in-
creased risk; (3) they facilitate the flow of new capital into the
banking system; and (4) they further the goals ofthe dual banking
system and are, we believe, consistent with the purposes that
animated Congress in the various banking statutes applicable to
insured depository institutions today.
1. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN BANKS
AND NONBANKS
One argument in favor of consumer choice banks is that they
avoid the skyrocketing costs of federal deposit insurance, costs
that have become a significant drag on bank profits and that are
likely to rise even further in future years. Indeed, the costs of
deposit insurance have risen to the point that some banks might
actually be able to gain a competitive advantage over other banks
by operating without deposit insurance.
A decade ago, the idea that a bank would voluntarily eschew
federal deposit insurance would have seemed preposterous. De-
posit insurance was extraordinarily cheap and provided bank cus-
tomers with an inexpensive assurance that their funds would be
safe. Today, however, it is not at all clear that the absence of fed-
eral deposit insurance would be a fatal impediment to the ability
of a bank to operate. The reason is that deposit insurance is no
longer an obvious subsidy to banking institutions.
The effective cost of deposit insurance has increased more
than five-fold since 1984. As shown in Table 1, prior to 1990 the
deposit insurance assessment for commercial banks stood at 8.3
basis points - 8.3¢ per $100 of insured deposits. In 1990, how-
ever, premiums rose to 12 basis points, and the following year
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they went to 19.5 and then 23 basis points. Most recently, the
FDIC has decided to raise premiums to an average of 25.4 basis
points after adjustment for risk. There is reason to believe that
the premiums will rise even higher in coming years.71
Table 1: Insurance Assessments at Banks and Thrifts








1993 (proposed) 25.4¢ (average) 25.4¢ (average)
Source: CCH Fed. Banking L. Rep. 47,334 (figures for 1990 and 1991); 88,542
(1992 figures); P. Bartholomew, Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance 30 (CBO
1990); Rhem, FDIC Fixes Premium at Average 25.4¢, Am. Banker, Sept. 16,
1992, at 1.
This increase from 8.3 to 25.4 basis points over a four year
period is dramatic enough, but it only captures part of the full
story, for it omits the rebates which banks traditionally received
from the FDIC on their premium assessments. Because very few
banks failed, the FDIC traditionally returned about half of its as-
sessment income to insured banks each year.72 The effective as-
sessment costs for banks were thus more like 4 basis points than
the nominal 8.3 basis points. Beginning in 1981, however, the
flow ofrebates began to dry up; the effective assessment rose to 7
basis points in 1981-83,73 and beginning in 1984 the FDIC
stopped paying out any rebates at all.74 There is no realistic pros-
71. The FDIC's decision not to raise assessments for 1992 was based more
on the shaky condition of the banking industry than on any judgment that in-
creased assessments will not be necessary to replenish the insurance funds. See
Rehm, Seidman Sees No Need to Hike FDIC Premium, Am. Banker, September
II, 1991, at 1.
72. See M. Schroeder, Bank Officer's Handbook of Commercial Banking
Law 11.01[3] (6th ed. 1989).
73. See Silverberg, Raising Premiums Will Cause Wave ofChange in indus-
try, Am. Banker, September 20, 1990, at 4.
74. See Rehm, FDIC's Shortfall Hit $10 billion in 88, Am. Banker, April 26.
1989, at 1.
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pect that rebates will start again any time soon.
Moreover, the real cost of assessments is also a function of
the amount of effective insurance coverage offered by the FDIC.

















Source: P. Bartholomew, Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance 36-37 (CBO
1990); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System:
Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, Figure 6 (1991).
Congress has repeatedly increased the nominal coverage limits,
from $5,000 in 1933 to $100,000 in 1980. These increases rep-
resent an approximate doubling of explicit coverage in real
terms.75 And these figures actually understate the increase in real
coverage, since starting with the onset of a wave of bank failures
in the early 1980s and lasting until very recently, the FDIC's
strong preference was to facilitate purchase and assumption
transactions in which all depositors, even those with deposits in
excess of the $100,000 coverage limit, were made whole.76 More
recently, however, this de facto infinite coverage has been scaled
back. Congress instructed the FDIC in 1991 to utilize the least
cost resolution procedure and (by 1994 at the latest) not to bail
out uninsured depositors if doing so results in any increased costs
to the Bank Insurance Fund.77 Thus, it appears that de facto cov-
erage levels will be reduced at the same time as the effective costs
of premiums is skyrocketing.
The utility to the banking industry of uninsured depository
75. See P. Bartholomew, Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance 36 (CBO
1990).
76. See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for
Bank Control, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1153, 1182 (1988).
77. FDICIA § 141, to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(I)(i). Under
limited conditions, the FDIC may pay off uninsured depositors to avoid systemic
risks.
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facilities is apparent, not only from the costs of deposit insurance
assessments that such a facility would avoid, but, equally impor-
tandy, because such a facility would allow banks to compete on a
more level playing field with uninsured financial institutions
which are increasingly offering transaction services. The most
significant such competitor is the money market mutual fund. As
we discuss in other work,78 investors in money market mutual
funds now enjoy transaction privileges similar to those of bank
depositors: the holder of such a fund can write checks to third
parties which are accepted in the course of business as readily as
are bank checks. It is true that most money market mutual funds
impose limits on the number of checks than can be written in a
given period, or on the minimum size of checks. but these limita-
tions can be substantially overcome by the use of credit cards for
the acquisition ofcash from automatic teller machines and for the
consummation of day-to-day transactions. It is quite practicable
today for a wealthy individual to opt out of the banking system by
combining the use of a money market mutual fund and credit
cards (which might be issued by an institution other than a bank);
indeed, many have done so already.
Among the advantages that a money market mutual fund of-
fers over banks is the fact that, because the fund obligations are
not insured by the FDIC, the costs of federal deposit insurance
premiums are not passed on to customers in the fonns of higher
fees or lower interest. This cost saving, in turn. gives the money
market mutual fund a significant cost advantage over the commer-
cial bank - an advantage that is likely to grow more significant
over time as the deposit insurance assessments increase. Banks
are likely to lose increasing market share to these nonbank depos-
itory institutions simply as a result of the costs of deposit insur-
ance, not to mention the other disadvantages under which banks
labor which we discuss below. The predictable consequence is
that over the coming years banks will suffer increasing competi-
tion for their core deposit businesses. competition that banks will
be unable to match unless they, too, are able to offer a fonn of
uninsured deposit account to bank customers.79
All this strongly suggests that the benefits of deposit insur-
ance are no longer so great as to make it impossible for a bank to
78. See Macey & Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regu-
lation, _ Michigan L. Rev. _ (1992).
79. Banks are permitted to act as investment advisors to money market mu-
tual funds, but cannot distribute interests in the fund without running afoul of
the Glass-Steagall Act. See Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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conduct its business without federal deposit insurance. A bank
could, we believe, operate effectively without deposit insurance
provided that the bank customer had reasonable assurance as to
the probability of repayment of the obligations. This does not
mean that customers would demand an iron-clad guarantee that
their deposits be repaid in full; customers would accept some
tradeoff of risk in exchange for increased return on their
investments.
2. PROVIDING CONSUMERS AND SMALL BUSINESSES WITH ACCESS
TO UNINSURED DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
The cost savings made possible by relinquishing deposit in-
surance would not be wholly or even principally captured by the
consumer choice bank itself. Rather, to a considerable extent, the
pressure of competition would force consumer choice banks to
pass these advantages ort to their customers in the form of higher
interest rates or lower fees on deposit accounts. Consumers
would have the option of investing their funds in an insured, low-
interest account at an ordinary bank or thrift institution, in an un-
insured, higher-interest account at a consumer choice bank, or in
a combination of insured and uninsured accounts.SO Other
things equal, it would appear desirable to allow consumers to
make their own decisions about whether they prefer to invest in
higher-yielding uninsured accounts or lower-yielding insured
accounts.
It is particularly appropriate for consumers to obtain the ben-
efit of higher-yielding, uninsured deposits in light of the fact that
wealthy individuals and larger businesses have enjoyed this op-
tion for years. As we document in another study,SI corporate
treasurers wanting to obtain maximum yield for their institutions'
funds coupled with a high degree of liquidity need not deposit
these funds in insured accounts at banks. They have many other
options for short-term, high-yield investments which, while not
perfectly secure, are nevertheless very safe. They may, for exam-
ple, make deposits in the Eurodollar call market,S2 maintaining
80. Consumers can, of course, already go into uninsured money market
funds or other uninsured investments (such as the stock market), but they might
prefer to have some of their funds in a transaction account at a bank where the
funds could earn interest based on the bank's profit on its loan portfolio.
81. Macey & Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regula-
tion, _ Michigan L. Rev. _ (1992) (forthcoming).
82. The Eurodollar market is the market for deposits denominated in dol-
lars in banks or branches outside the United States. M. Stigum, The Money
Market 46 (3d ed. 1990).
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline -- 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 889 1991
ENHANCED CONSUMER CHOICE 889
transactional flexibility because the call market is essentially a de-
mand deposit account.83 Because Eurodollar deposits are not in-
sured, deposits in this market are not subject to the costs of
federal deposit insurance. Yet the Eurodollar market is a whole-
sale market only available to larger corporations, and not to indi-
viduals (other than the very wealthy) or smaller businesses.54
Corporate treasurers can also obtain the benefits ofa deposit
account without having to pay the passed-on costs of deposit in-
surance premiums by making bank deposits in the form of repur-
chase agreements ("repos"). In a repurchase agreement with a
bank, the supplier of funds "purchases" a security from a bank
under an agreement to resell at a later date for a higher price.
Although structured as a purchase and sale of a security, in eco-
nomic substance the repurchase agreement is a loan secured by
the securities that are ostensibly being bought and sold. A corpo-
rate treasurer can make an arrangement with a bank to place
funds in automatically renewable overnight repurchase agree-
ments, subject to the understanding that upon instructions from
the corporate treasurer the bank will transmit (by wire or other-
wise) some or all of the repurchase amount to a specified third
party. Alternatively, rather than structuring the transaction as a
renewable overnight repurchase agreement, the bank and the cus-
tomer can agree on an open repo arrangement of indefinite term
but callable on demand.85 At least some banks-probably most
business-oriented banks-have made repos as convenient an ar-
rangement as possible with their customers by adopting minimum
balance policies "under which any excess deposit balances the
customer holds with them are automatically invested in repo."86
The effect of these repurchase arrangements is substantially simi-
lar to a standard deposit account; but since the repo is technically
a sale of securities and not a deposit, the bank pays no deposit
insurance on the arrangement and can pass these cost savings
along to the corporate customer. As yet, repo arrangements such
as this appear to be available only to larger corporate accounts.
Thus ordinary depositors do not obtain the benefits of this form
of nondeposit transaction arrangement.87
83. See M. Stigum, The Money Market at 47 (3d ed. 1990).
84. Id. at 46-47.
85. Id. at 436.
86. Id. at 437.
87. We argue elsewhere that banks may begin to offer retail customers
some of these benefits by means of "retail repos". See Macey & Miller, Nonde-
posit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, _ Michigan L. Rev. _
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Other things equal, there appears to be little reason as a mat-
ter of policy why ordinary individual depositors should not be al-
lowed to make the considered choice to place their funds in
uninsured transaction accounts at a bank. At the moment, it is
difficult for ordinary bank customers to effectuate that choice,
although relatively easy for larger customers. The consumer
choice bank would rectify that disparity and allow smaller con-
sumers a wider range of choice regarding their transaction ac-
counts than they enjoy under the present banking system.
3. FACILITATING THE FLOW OF CAPITAL
INTO THE BANKING SYSTEM
We have already seen that a consumer choice bank can be
structured as a nonbank bank and that an institution owning or
controlling such a bank would not thereby be classified as a bank
holding company for purposes of the activities restrictions of the
Bank Holding Company Act.88 It appears quite possible that such
a nonbank bank could operate as a viable business entity today,
despite the assumption by the drafters of the 1987 legislation that
they were closing the nonbank bank "100phole."89
As noted above, depository institutions might not suffer ex-
cessive costs-and might actually benefit-from electing to oper-
ate without federal deposit insurance.9o It also seems feasible to
satisfy the additional requirement-that the institution either
avoid offering demand deposits or stay out of the business of
making commercial loans - without prohibitive limitations on
operations. A nonbank bank might raise capital by offering only
instruments such as certificates of deposit and time deposits.
More likely, it could stay out of the business of making commer-
cial loans, devoting its assets instead to home mortgages, per-
sonal loans, and investments in money market instruments such
as commercial paper. This institution could even make a limited
amount of traditional commercial loans so long as it did not en-
gage in the "business" of making such loans.
(1992). As yet, however, the use of repos as transaction accounts appears to be
nearly exclusively reserved for large customers.
88. See notes 61-70 and accompanying text supra.
89. The Senate Report predicted confidently that upon enactment of the
proposed legislation "[t]he nonbank bank loophole is closed." Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987, Report of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Rep. No. 100-19, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987).
The Conference Committee agreed. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987,
H.R. Rep. No. 100-261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1987).
90. See notes 71-79 and accompanying text supra.
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In light of recent experience, it hardly seems an enormous
sacrifice for a banking institution to eschew the commercial loan
market. As we demonstrate in prior work,91 technological and
market changes have left commercial banks with increasingly risky
loan portfolios as stable borrowers turned to direct,
nonintermediated markets (most importantly, the commercial pa-
per market) to meet their financing needs. Given that commercial
loans are evidently less attractive investments than they were in
years past, the costs of exiting the business would not appear
nearly as substantial as they might once have been. The nonbank
bank, in short, may remain a viable form of depository institution
for the provision of banking services in the 1990s.
If structured as a nonbank bank, the consumer choice bank
would offer the potential for allowing new capital into the bank-
ing system from the nonbank sector. As long as the consumer
choice bank limited itself to funding sources not withdrawable on
demand, or stayed out of the business of making commercial
loans, the strictures of the Bank Holding Company Act would not
apply to an institution owning or controlling such an institution.
Thus, consumer choice nonbank banks could be owned or con-
trolled by firms engaged in all sorts of industrial or financial activ-
ities. This limited breakdown of the barrier between banking and
commerce would facilitate the influx of new capital into the bank-
ing industry at a time when the existing capital has been reduced
by operational losses. Consumers and the banking system as a
whole stand to benefit.
4. PRESERVING THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
Another potential advantage of the consumer choice bank is
its potential role in serving the beneficial goals of the dual bank-
ing system. As analyzed by Professor Kenneth Scott in a seminal
article,92 The dual banking system can be understood andjusti-
fied as a means of facilitating competition among regulatory
agencies for charters, thus causing the regulatory system as a
whole to move in the direction of economic efficiency. In Profes-
sor Scott's model, the dual banking system allows depository in-
stitutions to select their own regulators - for example, by
converting between federal and state charters depending on the
91. See Macey & Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and Fu-
ture of the Current Crisis, 69 Wash. U.L.Q: 769 (1991).
92. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regula-
tion, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1977). For a discussion and partial critique, see Miller,
The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
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circumstances - and thus avoid becoming trapped by a regulator
and subjected to unnecessary, burdensome and inefficient
regulations.
The Scott thesis has been challenged by subsequent work by
Butler and Macey demonstrating that the competition between
state and federal regulators is steadily diminishing as Congress
increasingly preempts state regulations.9s Congress provided
substantial validation of the Butler-Macey critique in FDICIA,
which, as already noted, imposes sweeping preemptive federal
constraints on the operations of state-chartered savings associa-
tions and nearly as sweeping regulations on those of insured
state-chartered banks.94
Consumer choice banks would represent at least a partial re-
turn to the more flexible regulatory environment praised by Pro-
fessor Scott. We have seen that consumer choice banks would
operate free of most - although not all- of the preemptive fed-
eral legislation otherwise applicable to state-chartered institu-
tions. If consumer choice banks turn out to be preferable means
of conducting a depository institution business as compared with
banks operating with deposit insurance under existing federal
regulation, the depository institutions in question could shift
some or all of their operations over to the uninsured depository
facility, thus avoiding federal regulations which might be unnec-
essarily restrictive on the institution's activities or policies.
Consumer choice banks, moreover, would appear to serve an
essential value of federalism which underlies the dual banking
system: the value of facilitating experimentation with new forms
of doing business at the state level in order to develop a more
efficient economic system nationwide. The notion of the states as
"laboratories" for economic experimentation, common sinceJus-
tice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Leibman,05
would appear to be well-served by consumer choice banks, which
allow the states the regulatory and operational flexibility to struc-
ture the activities of banks chartered within their borders in ac-
cordance with a state's own view of proper public policy.
The ability of consumer choice banks to engage in invest-
ments or activities not permitted to insured depository institu-
tions should not be seen as any kind of regulatory accident.
93. Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System,
73 Cornell L. Rev. 677 (1988).
94. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
95. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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Congress has deliberately detennined to restrict preemptive fed-
eral legislation, for the most part, to insured depository institu-
tions, as to which the federal interest in preserving the federal
deposit insurance funds is direct and immediate. Congress has
not abandoned the principle of allowing states to detennine the
nature and scope of the regulations applicable to state-chartered
banks. Even the most recent legislation. passed in the midst of
the greatest crisis in the banking industry since the 1930s, does
not significantly limit the activities and powers of uninsured state-
chartered banks: Congress elected to impose the strictures of
FDICIA section 303 only on insured institutions, and left open
the option for uninsured institutions to continue to engage in ac-
tivities or make investments as authorized under state law.
Accordingly, uninsured depository facilities do not run
counter to the fundamental tenor of congressional enactments in
this area. On the contrary, they are consistent with Congress' re-
peated insistence that state authorities should have principal re-
sponsibility to define the nature and extent of the powers of
state-chartered banking institutions.
Potential Costs ofConsumer Choice Banks. - Against these bene-
fits, the consumer choice bank creates a number of potential
costs. These include the following: (1) the danger that consumers
will confuse uninsured with insured deposits, and place funds in
uninsured accounts in the mistaken belief that they are insured;
(2) the danger that uninsured depository facilities will effectively
"free ride" on the atmosphere of trust and confidence in the
banking system that is created by the pervasive presence of fed-
eral deposit insurance; and (3) the danger that uninsured deposi-
tory facilities will be subject to runs that might spill over to other
depository institutions, eventually causing systemic problems.
1. THE PROBLEM OF CONSUMER CONFUSION
The principal argument against the utility of consumer
choice banks would appear to be the concern for consumer confu-
sion. The argument is that the pervasive existence of deposit in-
surance among the nation's depository institutions may lull
consumers into believing that their deposits at depository institu-
tions are insured even when they are not. Consumers who in
good faith deposit money in an uninsured bank in the reasonable
expectation the money will be safe even if the bank fails are in for
a rude shock when they discover that the facts are othenvise. The
result could be a significant, unanticipated loss for the depositors.
a loss which they would willingly have avoided - for example. by
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depositing their funds in a lower-yielding, insured deposit else-
where - had they known about the risk they were taking on at the
uninsured institution.
The object lesson for these arguments was the experience of
depositors in privately insured savings and loans and credit un-
ions in Ohio,96 Maryland,97 and Rhode Island,98 many of whom
apparently deposited funds under the belief that the deposits
were insured by a government body. As it turned out, the depos-
its were not insured by any government body, at least not ex ante,
and depositors in the failed institutions were threatened with loss.
The unfortunate experience in these states has been thought to
teach two lessons: first, that federal deposit insurance is necessary
to prevent panics; and, second, that consumers are easily misled
into believing that their deposits are insured when in fact they are
not.
It does not follow, however, that deposit insurance is neces-
sary to prevent panics or that consumers are necessarily confused
about whether their accounts are insured or not. The unfortu-
nate situations in Rhode Island, Ohio and Maryland appeared to
stem in substantial part from the fact that the agencies insuring
deposits in those states had names that invited consumers into
the erroneous belief that their deposits were insured by a state
agency.99 As long as full disclosure is made to consumers that
accounts at consumer choice banks are not insured, the chance of
consumer confusion would be minimized. Consumers can be
trusted to make competent and informed decisions about what to
do with their money if given sufficient disclosure about the risks
involved in their decisions. Existing law already requires that
consumers be carefully warned about the risks of depositing their
funds in a consumer choice bank. loo If further safeguards are re-
96. See Garsson, The Ohio Thrift Crisis, Am. Banker, March 22, 1985, at 1.
97. See Report of the Special Counsel on the Maryland Savings and Loan
Crisis, Am. Banker, June 6, 1986, at 4.
98. See 77 Federal Reserve Bulletin 425 (1991) (statement of Richard
Syron, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, to the Subcommittee on
General Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs); Atkinson, Credit Unions: Collapse of Private Insurer
Keeps Eyes on Rhode Island, Am. Banker, January 29, 1991.
99. The Rhode Island insurance firm was the "Rhode Island Share and De-
posit Indemnity Corporation," see 77 Federal Reserve Bulletin 425
(1991)(statement of Richard Syron, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).
The Maryland insurer was known as the "Maryland Savings Share Insurance
Fund," see Let's Cancel Private Bank Insurance, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1985.
100. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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quired, it would be perfectly possible for states to impose them as
a matter of state law.
2. FREE RIDER PROBLEMS
A related objection to consumer choice banks is that such in-
stitutions would implicitly free ride on a public good created by
the federal deposit insurance programs, namely the confidence
with which the public views the nation's banking system generally
as a result of the fact that the vast majority of depository institu-
tions are federally insured. According to this argument, con-
sumer choice banks would be able to attract deposits in such an
atmosphere of public trust and confidence at a much lower cost
of funds than they would have to pay if most banks were unin-
sured. Thus consumer choice banks would be implicitly subsi-
dized by insured banks that must pay federal deposit insurance
assessments.
Like the consumer confusion argument, the free rider argu-
ment is essentially premised on the notion that the public cannot
reliably distinguish between insured and uninsured institutions.
If the public can reliably distinguish between these types of insti-
tutions, the consumer choice bank would not have much ability to
free ride on insured depository institutions, simply because the
public's confidence in insured depository institutions would not
spill over to uninsured institutions. By the same token, if the
public can reliably distinguish between insured and uninsured in-
stitutions, the failure of an uninsured institution should not sig-
nificantly reduce public confidence in the integrity of their
deposits in insured institutions.
Moreover, while depositors in consumer choice banks would
obviously be subject to greater failure risk than holders of depos-
its insured by the FDIC (who face no risk), it is not clear that con-
sumer choice banks would actually present a serious failure risk in
most cases. Recall that such banks would be regulated by the
states, which might elect to impose special regulations in light of
the absence of deposit insurance. Moreover, the managers of
consumer choice banks, because they are subject to real depositor
monitoring, can be expected to work hard to ensure the bank's
solvency and to provide assurances to depositors that their funds
are not in jeopardy. One would expect that, other things equal,
consumer choice would on average be more conservatively man-
aged than insured banks because depositors would demand assur-
ances of careful management before entrusting their funds to an
uninsured account.
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Even if some degree of free riding on the public's trust in
depository institutions is possible for consumer choice banks,
that cost must be weighed against the substantial public benefits
that these banks appear to offer, in the form of more efficient op-
erations, potentially beneficial economies of scope through the
mixing of banking and nonbanking financial activities, and more
motivated managers subject to the lash of depositor discipline.
On balance, the costs of free riding do not appear significant
enough to raise serious concerns about the utility of consumer
choice banks.
3. RUNS AND PANICS
A final major argument against consumer choice banks is
that, even if depositors in such banks are fully informed of the
risks of their investments, and even if the problem of free-riding
on public confidence in the banking system is not serious, there is
still the danger that runs on consumer choice banks would spread
to insured depository institutions, or to many other uninsured in-
stitutions, to the potential detriment of the economy as a whole.
While this problem cannot be discounted, it appears that the
limited experiment in consumer choice banks we recommend in
this paper would not pose a serious risk of systemic breakdown.
If, as we have suggested, consumers could distinguish insured
from uninsured banks, it is exceedingly unlikely that the failure of
a consumer choice bank, or even of a substantial number of such
banks, would spread to the insured segment of the industry. It is
true that the failures of private insurance systems in Maryland,
Ohio and Rhode Island caused minor panics at institutions cov-
ered by the private insurance systems. In those cases, however,
the panics were understandable since the information available to
depositors - that the private insurance fund was insolvent - ap-
plied to all the banks covered by the insurers in question. The
risks of consumer choice banks would not be so heavily cross-cor-
related. Moreover, the panics in those states did not spill out to
any significant degree into the insured bank sector. The public
was evidently able to distinguish between institutions that were
governmentally insured and ones that were not. There is, accord-
ingly, little reason to believe that the establishment of consumer
choice banks would create any significant risk of a widespread
bank panic.
CONCLUSION
This article has explored a regulatory option that appears to
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be relatively untested in today's changing banking marketplace:
the uninsured deposit facility or consumer choice bank. We have
demonstrated that the legal regulations applicable to consumer
choice banks would be significantly different than those applica-
ble to similarly situated insured banks. Consumer choice banks
can potentially engage in a considerably broader range of activi-
ties than can their insured cousins. This is not to say that con-
sumer choice banks would be unregulated: to the contrary, they
would be subject to some, albeit minimal, federal regulation and
to whatever substantive regulations might be imposed by their
chartering states.
On the whole, consumer choice banks would appear to offer
significant benefits for banking institutions, for consumers and
for the economic system. The banking industry today is exper-
iencing competition from money market mutual funds and other
nonbank institutions that are not required to pay the increasingly
expensive deposit insurance assessments. Even under the forth-
coming regime of risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums, it is
not clear that the banking industry will be able to withstand this
competition without serious stress. The consumer choice bank
offers a more level regulatory playing field in which the competi-
tion between banks and mutual funds can play itself out to the
benefit of consumers of financial services generally.
Another advantage of the consumer choice bank is that it of-
fers to consumers and small businesses the option, now available
principally to wealthy individuals and to larger businesses, of
committing funds to an uninsured transaction account. Other
things equal, there appears to be little merit in denying ordinary
consumers access to the higher interest rates that uninsured bank
accounts would offer as compared with insured accounts.
Consumer choice banks would, if structured as nonbank
banks, permit the inflow of new capital into the banking industry
from firms that are not permitted to acquire an insured institution
because their activities are not deemed closely related to banking
under the Bank Holding Company Act. Other things equal, the
inflow of new capital would appear to offer significant potential
benefits for the condition of this distressed industry.
The consumer choice bank would facilitate a relatively con-
trolled experiment with deregulation of the banking industry.
Because consumer choice banks are not generally subject to the
pervasive preemptive federal regulatory scheme which applies to
all insured depository institutions to one degree or another, such
banks could, at the option of their chartering states, be allowed to
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
HeinOnline -- 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 898 1991
898 1991 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
engage in a broader range of activities and investments than is
permissible for their insured cousins. The experience of unin-
sured depository facilities could then be assessed in determining
whether it would be wise to allow insured institutions to engage
in similar activities.
Moreover, the consumer choice bank would facilitate the re-
alization of ideals of federalism which have long animated the
bank regulatory structure. A principal justification of the dual
banking system is that it permits genuine differences in regulatory
treatment to exist between different types of depository institu-
tions. The regulatory options available under the dual banking
system have been increasingly suppressed of late as the federal
government has exercised its preemptive muscle to cast a blanket
of uniformity over the industry. The consumer choice bank rep-
resents a partial return to the ideals of federalism and freedom of
movement among regulatory regimes that have traditionally char-
acterized our dual banking system.
While the consumer choice bank offers a variety of benefits, it
is not without potential costs. We recognize that consumers
would be ill-served if they were induced to believe that their de-
posits in a consumer choice bank were in fact insured. Moreover,
if there is even a colorable claim of confusion, depositors who
have suffered loss in a consumer choice bank will lobby the polit-
ical system to reimburse their losses. However, existing law al-
ready requires substantial disclosure that the deposits are not
insured and that the depositor stands to suffer loss if the bank
fails. States would be free to impose such additional disclosure or
consumer protection requirements as they see fit. Thus there
would appear to be adequate safeguards in place already, or
within the reach of state regulators, to overcome the danger of
consumer confusion.
Another potential danger of consumer choice banks is the
possibility that they will free ride on the public good of public
confidence in the banking system that is created by the deposit
insurance system. If such free riding in fact took place to a signifi-
cant extent, consumer choice banks might be seen as imposing a
cost on society in that the amount of federal deposit insurance
and the level of public confidence in the banking system would
be lower under a system of consumer choice banks than it would
be if uninsured depository facilities could be made to pay for the
benefit they receive from federal deposit insurance. However, we
believe that the free riding problem would not be significant if the
danger of public confusion is successfully overcome. If the public
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understands that a bank that fails is an uninsured bank, the level
of confidence in the insured segment of the banking system will
not be seriously eroded by publicity given to failures ofuninsured
banks.
A third possible danger is the disruptive effect of runs and
panics. Although state bank regulators could mitigate the run
danger to an extent by capital adequacy regulation, there is no
question but that a consumer choice bank, even one subject to
capital adequacy regulation at the state level, is subject to runs in
a way that an insured bank is not. This fact alone, however, is not
a conclusive demonstration of the social disutility of the con-
sumer choice bank. The social costs of a bank run may not be
overly severe if the run does not spread to a generalized panic.
Moreover, bank runs have benefits as well as costs. The threat of
a bank run keeps bank managers alert to the welfare ofdepositors
and the safety and soundness of their banks. And the speed with
which a depository institution is closed in a bank run may repre-
sent a net social benefit if the institution is losing money and
should be closed quickly.
The panic problem is somewhat more problematic. No one
would want to see a repeat of the bank panic of 1933. As long as
uninsured depository facilities remain a relatively limited part of
the financial services sector, however, the danger that the failure
of anyone institution or even the linked failure of several such
institutions would tum into generalized panic does not seem re-
alistic, especially if the public is sufficiently informed that a run on
an uninsured depository facility does not threaten insured
institutions.
In short, we recommend that the banking industry and state
bank regulators consider the possible utility of the uninsured de-
pository facility, or consumer choice bank, as a new form - albeit
one with a long pedigree - for the provision offinancial products
and services in the rapidly changing banking marketplace of the
1990s.
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